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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* —Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Mr. Russell on Our Knowledge of the External World. H. A. PRICHARD. Mind, N. S., No. 94, pp. 145–186.

This article is a critical examination of Mr. Russell's account of our knowledge of the physical world as set forth in his Lowell Lectures and his recent article in *Scientia.* Mr. Russell unquestioningly accepts the empiricist's starting-point. He assumes that we know by perception only immediate sense-data, not atoms or permanent things. How then can we justify the beliefs of science and common sense in the latter? Their existence is not directly apprehended, nor can it be inferred from the data of sense. The new logic alone can vindicate these beliefs, by its method of logical, hypothetical or intellectual construction, substituting logical constructions for the supposedly inferred entities in the worlds of science and common sense. What Mr. Russell means by "construction" he does not make clear. It might at first seem that his position would lead to Berkeleianism or solipsism; but he maintains that all sense-data, though dependent on nothing else such as bodies or a substratum, have yet an existence of their own independently of being given in sense to any individual. The term "sense-data" he uses equivocally. Sense-data are regarded as physical rather than mental; but neither term is adequately defined. Mr. Russell holds that each individual lives in a private world, containing a private space made up of as many different spaces as there are senses. But this doctrine is untrue; only bodies, not appearances, can be spatially related. A plurality of spaces in any other sense than parts of one all-embracing space is an impossibility for thought. Since there is no such thing as 'a space,' there is no such thing as 'a private space.' Mr. Russell offers as a justification of this doctrine the thesis that no 'sensible' is ever a datum to two persons at once. But this thesis is established only by presupposing the very view which Mr. Russell is attempting to oppose, viz., that we perceive not spatially related appearances, but spatially related bodies, and that two people can see the same body. Further, if what is given in sense exists independently of being so given, the sense-data of different persons cannot belong to worlds distinct from one another and from a world of science incapable of being given in sense at all. Once this independence is granted, there is no reason to maintain that all groups of realities are not parts of one world or one system. Mr. Russell can escape inconsistency only by meaning by a private world, a world dependent on me, *i. e.*, such that if I had not existed, it would not have existed. The appearances that are not appearances to me which Mr. Russell introduces into my private world apparently to give it a completeness without which it would be difficult to describe it as a world at all, have no right to be there. Mr. Russell's doctrine of the space of perspectives, a physical space in which infinite private spaces are spatially related, leads to such amazing results as spatially infinite systems of appearances, which are appearances to no one, at finite distances from one another, the treating of infinite magnitudes as if they were points with no magnitudes at all, and appearances which are in three places at once. It is impossible to think of such a 'physical space.' Space does not consist of an infinity of points. The process Mr. Russell describes presupposes a knowledge of itself, of physical space, and of spatially related bodies independent of the percipient. Mr. Russell would retain the terms of science and common sense provided they be given the meanings assigned them in his definitions; but to do this would render the propositions containing them untrue. The doubly relative term 'appearance' is used by Mr. Russell in an absolute sense, *i. e.*, as a reality that has a nature in itself apart from some thing or percipient of which or for which it is an appearance. But apart from the latter the term has no significance. Since things and appearances, though parts of a single apprehension, are realities differing in kind, neither can be defined or expressed in terms of the other. In defining a thing as "a certain series of aspects" or as "the class of its appearances," Mr. Russell tacitly assumes that what alone distinguishes the group of appearances he designates 'a thing' and constitutes their unity is the fact that they are appearances or aspects of one and the same thing of common sense. In fact, Mr. Russell never succeeds in offering a definition of 'a thing,' but only of 'one and the same thing' of common sense. The very statement of his view requires the language and presupposes the truth of the common sense view he wishes to supersede (that there are bodies which we see), and is intelligible only because we already have this view. Mr. Russell has not faced the problems of showing that there is a common sense process by which from thinking of appearances just as appearances we come to think of them as appearances of bodies, and of giving a 'true interpretation' of this process including a definition of 'a thing.' The fact that there is no such process is Mr. Russell's greatest difficulty. Mr. Russell has more affinity with Hume than with any other philosopher. He should have shared Hume's attempt to show how the 'illusions' of common sense arose, though like Hume he would have been inevitably doomed to failure.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

The Ultimate Constituents of Matter. BERTRAND RUSSELL. The Monist, XXV, 3.

The world is divisible into mind and matter. Thinking, desiring, feeling, willing, and perceiving are mental occurrences; but objects of perception, the immediate data of sense, are not mental or subjective, but physical, outside the mind, and logically independent of the mind. Yet, since they are causally dependent on the body, sense-data are not persistent or indestructible; rather, they are fleeting, destructible or in a state of perpetual change, and do not continue to exist when no longer perceived. The persistent particles of Mathematical Physics, like 'classes' and 'things' of Common Sense, are not real or substantial, but simply logical construction or symbolic fictions. Persistence is an illusion arising from the approach to continuity in the series of unique, successive, momentary particulars that comprise our world. The world is a multitude of just such particulars, arranged, because of their relations, like notes in a symphony according to a plan, and bound together not by numerical identity but by continuity and certain intrinsic causal laws. Incorrect notions of space, time, causality, and matter have prevented philosophers from recognizing the physical, yet ephemeral, nature of sense-data, and from allotting them their rightful place among the ultimate constituents of matter or the physical world. Matter is a logical construction composed of evanescent particles, which may, when an observer happens to be present, become data of sense. The phrase, *the cause,* is misleading, since it implies a uniqueness that does not exist: any set of antecedents from which an event can be theoretically inferred by means of correlations may be called *a cause.* Time, like space, is an aggregate of corpuscles or atoms. The assemblage of all particles having a simple, direct, spatial relation to a given particular and simultaneous with it is called a *perspective;* the total of all particulars directly simultaneous with or successive to it, a *biography.* A perspective cannot be defined as all the data of one percipient at one time, for there are unperceived perspectives; and, likewise, there are biographies not actually lived. The total of perspectives may be termed physical space; but any such all-embracing space or any all-embracing time is a logical construction, for between different percipients' perspectives no direct, but only constructed, spatial and temporal relations obtain. Since it is not probable that two persons ever perceived the same object at the same moment of time, no two persons' spaces have a place in common. There are a multitude of these private or exclusive three-dimensional spaces, perceived and unperceived, which, when themselves arranged in a three-dimensionsal order, by correlating particulars regarded as members or aspects of one 'thing' or by manipulating them into the physicist's 'matter,' yield a six-dimensional space in which position is purely relative. Some such dissection of physical things into series or classes of particulars is the only way to overcome the conflict of Physics and Psychology and escape epistemological dilemmas.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

The Meaning of Causality. J. ELLIS MCTAGGART. Mind, N. S., 95, pp. 326–344.

The two following characteristics of causality have been universally admitted: (1) Causality is a relation of Determination, in which the cause implies the effect. Implication is a relation between propositions or truths, and not between events, although the justification of our knowledge contained in these propositions is due to relation between the events themselves. (2) Causality is a relation between realities which exist. The five following characteristics of causality are not universally admitted: (3) In causality a certain activity is exerted by one term of the relation on the other, as illustrated by the connection between an act of volition and the event willed. (4) The cause determines the effect in some way in which the effect does not determine the cause. (5) In the relation of causality one term is *explained* by its holding that relation to the other. (6) The cause cannot be subsequent to the effect, but need not be prior. Also it is held that a timeless existent reality can be the cause of events in time. (7) A causal relation is always between substances, but always rests on a relation between characteristics. We shall include in our definition only the first two of these seven characteristics ascribed to causation, and say that causation is a relation of implication between existent substances. The seventh characteristic is involved in the fact that the relation of causality is one of implication, since implication is always of characteristics. But all characteristics (*i. e.*, qualities or relations) are universals. Hence any causal relation between particulars rests on a relation between universals. The third, fourth, fifth, and sixth characteristics of causation enumerated above must be rejected. (3) No reason can be given for asserting that the cause exerts an activity, except the evidence of introspection. But even when our volitions are causes it is not possible to demonstrate any such activity. (4) And if all conditions are fully stated, we cannot say that the one which would generally be called the cause determines the other more than it is determined. (5) The cause does explain the effect provided the events are merely taken as instances of a general law. But the law in its turn can only be explained by reference to some more general law, until we reach a causal law which is ultimate. All ultimate causal laws are empirical truths. (6) As for the contention that the cause cannot be subsequent to the effect, we must consider that we have not as yet found any criterion by which to distinguish the cause from the effect in a causal relation. And if the distinction between cause and effect depended solely on temporal order, there could be no causal relation between simultaneous events, or between two substances one or both of which is out of time. So that the most convenient course would seem to be to speak of causal relations as existing between two terms, but not to designate one of these terms as cause and the other as effect. Whether causation is universally valid is beyond the scope of this paper, but we can inquire as to what its universal validity would mean. For causality to hold universally it would be necessary that each characteristic of any substance in each case in which it occurred should be implied by some other characteristic which had occurred. The universality of causality is what is meant when we speak of the uniformity of nature. It can be stated so that it does not assert reciprocal determination, because the cause may stand for any characteristic which occurs in the universe, while the effect stands for only such characteristics as fulfil the required conditions with reference to the cause. If reciprocal determination is taken to mean that every determination of one characteristic by another is reciprocal, it is clear that reciprocal determination does not hold universally. The broader meaning of reciprocal determination is that every characteristic has at least one determination which is reciprocal. It is impossible to prove empirically that this law does not hold universally. On the other hand, it is also impossible to prove the law of reciprocal causal determination from the law of the uniformity of nature, even if the latter were itself established. It has sometimes been asserted that complete knowledge of any substance would imply complete knowledge of any other substance. The implication of the nature of each substance with that of every other is in one sense true, in that complete *knowledge* of one substance would give us complete knowledge of every other. But that this knowledge could be *deduced* from knowledge of one substance, even if we knew the laws by which one substance causally determines another, is not necessarily true so long as the two substances are related, as they very well may be, by some relation other than that of implication. The universal validity of causal determination is not self-evident *a priori*, and could only be proved by a chain of reasoning resting on premises known *a priori*. Such validity might be proved with respect to characteristics of certain classes, even if it were not proved with respect to all.

MARION D. CRANE.

The Subject-matter of Metaphysical Inquiry. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 13, pp. 337–345.

A number of biologists hold that the application of a physico-chemical explanation to living organisms forces us to recognize that the world out of which life developed held potential within itself the possibility or potentiality of life, and that the consideration of such 'ultimate origins' must be metaphysical rather than scientific. But any intelligible question as to causation seems to be wholly scientific, taking us back through a series of changes. A question about ultimate origin or ultimate causation is either a meaningless question, or else the words are used in a relative sense to designate the point in the past at which a particular inquiry breaks off. There are however in all scientific investigations such irreducible traits as *i. e.*, specifically diverse existences, interaction, change. Inquiry concerning these might be called metaphysical, and would at least wean men from a futile concern with ultimate origins and laws of causation. Formulae for the ancient states of nature are not got by deriving the source of subsequent events from an original state, but by starting with some present existence, tracing its earlier course, and at some point condensing the main features of this course into a formula. When we explain change by such a formula, in order to escape reasoning in a circle and to allow for interaction we must assume existences not covered by the formula, as for example the universe existing and including the solar system. So it is impossible to arrive at a formula which explains the whole. Potentiality is not a something which effects change, but refers to a characteristic of change. It signifies a certain limitation of present powers, due to the limited number of conditions with which they are in interaction, plus the fact of the manifestation of new powers under different conditions. And the very changes now going on have a tendency to expose the thing in question to these different conditions, which will call out new modes of behavior. So potentiality implies not merely diversity, but a progressively increasing diversification of a specific thing in a particular direction. Reference to the evolution of organization out of an earlier world, in which such organization was not found, means that the earlier condition was characterized by a change having the direction of vital and intelligent organization. Physico-chemical terms do not explain away the distinguishing features of living and thinking beings, but state their occurrence. The attempt to give an account of any occurrence involves the genuine and irreducible existence of the thing dealt with. Evolution seems to be a fact to be reckoned with in considering the irreducible traits of the world. If everything which is is a changing thing, the evolution of life and mind indicates the nature of the changes of physico-chemical things and therefore something about these things. Certainly the existence of vital, intellectual, and social organization makes impossible a purely mechanistic metaphysics, but it does not give us ground to say that the world as a whole is vital. "While metaphysics takes the world irrespective of any particular time, yet time itself or genuine change in a specific direction is itself one of the ultimate traits of the world irrespective of date."

MARION D. CRANE.

Response and Cognition. EDWIN B. HOLT. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 14, pp. 365–373; XII, 15, pp. 393–409.

In the evolution of life comes the critical point at which the reflex activities develop systematic relations of interdependence which enable them to function as one whole—an integrated result which the biologists have called behavior. Many workers in animal psychology, and some in human psychology, have been coming to the conclusion that it is behavior and not consciousness with which scientific observation deals. A closer definition of behavior is needed to show the remarkable novelty involved in it. What is behavior? To obtain the correct answer we must abandon the bead theory and, adopting the functional view, ask the scientific question, What is the organism doing? Empirical study shows, not only that the organism is doing something, but that this is a constant function of some aspect of the environment. "Behavior is any process of release which is a function of factors external to the mechanism released." The peculiar novelty is the distinctively objective reference to the environment, not found in the inorganic world, and not in the organic prior to the integrated reflex response.

With a compact definition of behavior we may ask, How far are the phenomena generally attributed to consciousness intrinsically involved in behavior? Firstly, the object of consciousness and the object of behavior are surely identical. Then, that function of this object which behavior is, is will—what one does is identical with one's volitions. The knower of the cognitive relation is clearly the body for behaviorism; and, though the body may not take the place of the metaphysical 'subject,' it serves the only actually empirical wants served by this 'subject,' and it may be able to give a complete account of cognition without the services of the 'metaphysical subject.' Behaviorism, then, gives a content of knowledge, a willer, and a knower. What is its relation to three remaining psychological phenomena: attention, feeling, and personality? If attention be explained in terms of clearness, the tendency toward the seemingly necessary explanation of degrees of consciousness as degrees of organization of content atoms is toward behaviorism. Or, if attention be interpreted in terms of process, the specific response relation has abundant explanation. With its integration system it also takes care of attention at the unconscious stage and explains admirably the relation of habitual to conscious activity. Feeling, for behaviorism, is due to some modification of response determined by factors *within* the organism. From the definition of behavior and even a slight knowledge of living tissue, this phenomenon can easily be predicted. Behaviorism may well wait, to give its explanation, until psychologists have something at least resembling a scientific description of the phenomenon. Now, what is the soul? These functions, which the organism's behavior is of the object, are of various degrees of integration and in a well-knit character they become organized into higher forms of behavior, so that at every moment of life—unless there has been suppression—there is some interest (behavior) to which a man's "whole being is consecrated." The unthwarted lifelong progress of behavior integration is the transition from behavior to *moral conduct*. The sane man has no suppressions but his behavior is adapted to the environment; to be wise he must add scope. "Only the sane man is good and only the sane man is free." For behaviorism the personality is the attitude and conduct of the body. Only when the daily integration of behavior is successfully accomplished is the soul a unit.

Conclusion: Behaviorism can lay considerable claim to being the long-sought cognitive relation between 'subject' and object. The future of psychology—human as well as animal—lies in the hands of the behaviorists and of those who, wishing to resolve the subjective category of soul-substance into objective relations, have much of common ground with the behaviorists and may wish to join their ranks.

ELLEN B. ARMSTRONG.

The Logical-Analytic Method in Philosophy. THEODORE DE LAGUNA. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 17, pp. 449–462.

In *Our Knowledge of the External World* and "The Relation of our Sense Data to Physics," *Scientia*, 1914, Mr. Bertrand Russell sets forth the "logical analytic" method as one of revolutionary importance in philosophy. He makes pure logic the central study of philosophy, although he does not hold to this strictly. Aside from certain differences, the method is like that of Descartes, who tried to analyze complex data to final simple and independent premises. The writer questions Mr. Russell's account of the method on the following points: (1) It is misleading to speak of "the very last stage of analysis." *Is* there a last stage? Moreover, analysis must be continually checked by synthesis. (2) The problem that the method undertakes to solve may not have a unique solution. (3) The attempt to fit materials for philosophy into logical frameworks leads to barren scholasticism. The maxim of the parsimony of assumptions is important, but should be taken with the precaution that the assumed entities need not be the most real. Mr. Russell's assuming of sense-data is a good working hypothesis so far as it goes, but the *sensibilia* that he claims to be inferred from them seem to be mere *Dinge an sich.* In the construction of the external world, he overlooks the psychological factors. As to the illustration of the value of the method, the application to mathematics has doubtless been of great value. Not so with the construction of the physical world. Considering the sense of sight for simplicity, Mr. Russell constructs a three-dimensional space by correlating different "private worlds" or "perspectives" by similarity. For example, a straight line in space can be constructed by a graduated series of similar perspectives in which a penny appears as a circular disc. This construction is theoretically inadequate, as it fails to give a finely articulated space, and practically impossible, as it would involve an impossible amount of recording of perspectives. Nor is this the way in which the world of physical space has actually been constructed. There, *measurement* plays the chief part. The definition of the matter of a thing as the limit of its appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes, is also weak. To sum up, Mr. Russell's task of the construction of the physical world is impossible, even granting the disputed existence of sense-data. As a matter of fact, observation never has to do with sense-data, but with material events built up by association.

YUEN R. CHAO.

Types of Pragmatist Theory of Truth. ALLAN TÖRNUDD. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 18, pp. 491–500.

Among the significant features of the pragmatic theory of truth is the proclamation of 'satisfaction' as relevant to the determination of truth. This is bound up with a psychological theory of the meaning and function of ideas, which is accepted by psychologists far outside the camp of pragmatism proper. In narrowing down the pragmatic theory of truth, we must choose among several types of theory. The first is that which recognizes only certain *specific* satisfaction as relevant to the truth of a belief. Here belongs the theory that the truth of any pragmatically interpreted idea consists in the specific satisfaction experienced on acting upon the idea, because the content of the idea was just the expectation of that experience. If pragmatism is taken as a theory of the criterion of truth, we find it interpreted as meaning simply that only the actual experience of *that* satisfaction which represents the whole object and intention of the idea, *proves* it to be true. The frequent attempts to correlate religious and scientific truths, by showing both to be true in so far as tested, belongs also in this class. We may also add here the theory that *any* satisfactory outcome of the act which is the practical expression of a belief makes it "true in so far forth." It eliminates specific satisfaction, but identifies 'validated' with experienced truth. These theories add nothing new to the older empirical views of truth. A second main type of pragmatism is the *any*-satisfaction theory. Here we get the idea, for instance, that the expectation of satisfactory experience in a future life is somehow warranted by the *present* satisfactory outcome of such belief. The outcome of the foregoing theories is that we find ourselves engaged in comparing particular expectations and experiences, and to their coherence, discrepancy, etc., and cannot make headway by introducing the idea of 'satisfaction' into the field. A third and more promising type of pragmatism, is not a theory as to why and what we can or must believe. It is not a theory of truth in the older sense. Its import is that the theoretically correct judgment does not satisfy on account of its correctness, but on account of its pragmatic usefulness. It would be better understood than it commonly is, if put in the form: 'the true (= theoretically correct) judgment is not found valuable on account of its truth' . . . This asserts that falsehood is often more valuable than truth. This may turn out to be the lasting part of the pragmatic theory of truth.

D. T. HOWARD.

The Logic of Judgments of Practise. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XII, 19, pp. 505–523.

Practical judgments, such as: 'A should do thus and so'; 'it is better, wiser, etc., to act thus and so', are marked from other judgments in the following respects: (1) Their subject-matter implies an incomplete situation. (2) It implies that the proposition is itself a factor in carrying forward the situation to its conclusion. (3) It implies that it makes a difference how the given is terminated, and that the proposition is to help to secure the better outcome. (4) A practical proposition is at once a judgment of the end to be realized and the means to be adopted. It may be noted here that the reciprocal nature of the practical judgment condemns both false idealism or utopianism, which does not consider means, and materialism or determinism, which regards situations as completely given. (5) Completeness in a practical judgment has reference not to data as such, but to their relevance to the end and its means. (6) Since the subject-matter is completed only by the issue, the truth or falsity of the proposition is constituted by the result of the verification. If this feature of the practical judgment is extended to apply to all propositions, then it will give a type of pragmatism. In this paper, the writer intends to apply the foregoing conclusions to the judgments of value. He holds that a judgment of value, which should be distinguished from the experience of a good, is only a species of practical judgment. This means that a value-judgment is not complete in itself, but that value itself is something to-be-given by future action. Value is concerned with the traits of objects only in so far as they enter into a possible and foreseen course of action. Value is not subjective, but practical. It is objective and existential in so far as it is an active factor in a practical situation. Valuation should be distinguished from merely recalling a previous value. To judge value is to institute one where none is given. The assumption that valuation is always referred to some fixed standard as the end rests on an ambiguity of the term end. In the sense of *de facto* limit to judgment, it is no value at all. In the sense of the completing object of the judgment, its value will depend upon a judgment, based upon weighing the claims of different factors and not upon comparison with a model. The reason why ones does make value-judgments if things do not already possess values is that the situation demands it, and the situation is not one of mere incompleteness, but has a specific character. It is true that we always consider the results of previous valuations, but we must also consider the changes of situation. In some degree, all valuation is a revaluation. The contention that the object of a practical judgment is some change in the given, depending upon, and constituting the subject-matter of the judgment, is not to be taken to mean an action of mind on matter. It is rather a logical point, that the realm of propositions presents in a realm of *possibility* the specific arrangement of things which overt action presents in actuality. This clears the road for considering on its own merits the general pragmatic hypothesis.

YUEN R. CHAO.

Logische und ontologische Wirklichkeit. N. HARTMANN. Kant-Studien, XX, 1, pp. 1-29.

Logic and epistemology ordinarily subordinate reality to possibility or necessity. Most theories of knowledge agree with Kant in defining the possible as whatever is in accord with the formal conditions of experience, the real as whatever is in accord with the material conditions of experience, and the necessary as whatever is in accord with both the formal and material conditions of experience. But these definitions are open to four objections: They make it possible (1) for that which is not in accord with the form of knowledge to be real; (2) for that which does so accord to be unreal; (3) for the real to be contingent or indeterministic; and (4) they exclude from the realm of necessity all non-sensible connections, such as the *a priori* connections of mathematics. For traditional Logic possibility, reality, and necessity form the so-called sphere of logical modality; and such a three-fold scale is inevitable for the evaluation of knowledge or judgments as such. But for a graduation of the modes of being this scale is inadequate, since it lacks certain modes altogether and does not exhibit the positive relations that obtain between the others. In estimating ontological modes, therefore, the following scale should be substituted:

	———	↑ Reality	(possibility + necessity)
	Necessity	Realization	(prevailingly necessity)
(undifferentiated reality and unreality)	Possibility	Development	(prevailingly possibility)
	———	Unreality	(undifferentiated possibility and impossibility)
	Impossibility	———	

In this table it is to be noted that, though possibility and necessity are indifferent to one another, they fall within the same modal genus, while reality, which stands to them in the relation of dependence, belongs to quite another modal sphere. Ontologically reality is not a middle grade between possibility and necessity, as it appears to be logically. It is, however, the synthesis of possibility and necessity, which ontologically it presupposes, and to which nevertheless it is logically indifferent. Reality is more than either possibility or necessity, its indispensable elements, and therefore caps the scale of ontological values with necessity second—inverting their logical order—and impossibility, as the most negative, last. Between necessity and impossibility stands possibility, and between reality and unreality stand the ethical and aesthetic modes of being: realization and development. Impossibility involves unreality, but not vice versa. Unreality is indifferent to impossibility and also to possibility and necessity, though not to their synthesis, reality, which it excludes. Impossibility, and also possibility and necessity when taken separately, are indifferent to reality, though the latter when taken together, involve reality and exclude unreality. It is especially to be noted that this table of ontological values is entirely independent of the table of logical values. The order of the certainty of knowledge is not the order of the modality of being.

RAYMOND P. HAWES.

Idealismus und Realismus in der Sphäre des philosophischen Kritizismus. BRUNO BAUCH. Kant-Studien, XX, 1, pp. 97-117.

Historically idealism and realism are intimately related, having a common origin in Kant; and even to-day their connection is closer than that between subjective and objective idealism. Messer is wrong in holding that objective idealism leads to subjective idealism and the latter to solipsism: Kant is not a reversion to Berkeley nor Berkeley to Stirner. It is its inquiry into the possibility of experience that distinguishes transcendental or objective idealism from the solipsism of Stirner, the subjectivism of Berkeley, and the phenomenalism of Schopenhauer, and enables it to refute the latter. So long as one fails to recognize an objective conformity to law, conditioning experience, the objectivity of the external thing is lost, whether one sees in space an empty conception or an absolute reality. Illusionism is the common goal of subjecttivism and dogmatic realism. Only the concept of knowledge as a logical, functional whole, and of space as a mathematical, law-abiding system of relations can guarantee the reality of the external object. Transcendental idealism does not take back into the subject the reality of the object, nor does it try to deduce from the essence of consciousness a hostile content or corporeal world. It is wholly one with realism in recognizing the external object's claim to reality, even when this object is not presented in subjective consciousness. All objectivity transcends the subject, a truth which is emphasized in Kant's conception of the thing-in-itself, intended by Kant for a transcendental, logical function, although apparently hypostatized at times into an independent metaphysical entity. It was on this point that idealism and realism first historically parted; the one contending that the subject and object were different, yet correlative, members of a single functional whole, the other hypostatizing the object as a 'Ding-an-sich' independent and outside of knowledge. According to objective idealism, as soon as this external object ceases to be a transcendental logical function and becomes a transcendent thing-in-itself, it loses its meaning and objectivity and remains a chimera or self-contradiction. This abandonment of things-in-themselves establishes idealism's right to be called empirical and realistic, even while maintaining that the transcendental ground of empirical reality is neither real nor empirical, neither things nor facts, but the laws of knowledge, their conditions, whose objective validity is independent of empirical experience. These conditions, however, do not form a second world beside or behind the empirical, for neither factor is anything without the other. Likewise, the eternal world of value, which must be presupposed as independent of the subject, is not a duplicate world, but an ideal, an eternal mission, realized in the one reality. Idealism and realism are not contradictory antitheses as Messer asserts. They agree that the external object is independent of "subjective knowledge"; but realism adds, "and of all knowledge." Idealism, however, is far from seeking from realism "peace at any price." If realism persists in its demand for an absolute existence outside the sphere of rational necessity, it must remain uncritical and unreasonable; such an empty unreality precludes discussion. But if realism will acknowledge the necessary and rational conditioning of all reality, it will then become critical and rational and will be taken up into (aufgehoben) transcendental idealism in the Hegelian sense of this term.

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